A Constitutional Convention

.... Congress may no longer be depended upon to correct themselves, nor to strip themselves of power willingly. At the present juncture especially, this would diametrically oppose their lust for control of our lives, which they have so clearly demonstrated and pursued repeatedly. Since they will never author the constitutional safeguards needed, it must be imposed upon them by others; and this, in itself, creates both an opportunity and a danger:

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.... Under the U.S. Constitution, Article 5, the only other method for proposing an amendment to the Constitution is through an application by two-thirds of the state legislatures. This has never actually been done in practice, so there is no precedent. However, the article states that Congress must then ‘call a Convention for proposing Amendments’ and this step introduces a danger that must be carefully navigated.

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.... One possible interpretation of this provision is that the convention could put anything it wished on the table for discussion, whether it was approved by the state legislatures beforehand or not. Depending on who attended the convention and who helped in crafting those amendments into their final form, this could lead to very serious problems in many directions. Therefore, the states must petition Congress in the narrowest of terms. This should include a joint resolution of the following nature, as a cover letter:

.... It is the opinion of the states that new safeguards must be instituted to protect the rights of our states and the liberty of our citizens. The safeguards we are proposing have been very narrowly crafted to restore the balance of powers that has been disturbed over the years. They involve a re-empowerment of the state legislatures as a counter balance to federal excesses.

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..... The states have followed the procedure allowed to them under the U.S. Constitution and have, by two-thirds of the states applying, recommended specific amendments. The federal Congress, likewise, has a supermajority procedure that they must accomplish if further issues are to be added for consideration. No other method of amendment for any other group has been constitutionally provided, and no other issues, inferior to the admission standards noted, must be allowed.

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.... Since the issues involved embody a revised power equation between the federal government and the state legislatures, we conclude that both must recuse themselves from this convention. Instead, our suggestion is that the governor of each state propose one representative; the federal senators of each state each propose one, and the state legislatures of each state each propose two (one from each house, excepting Nebraska which is unicameral, and will therefore recommend two). In every case, these delegates shall be citizens in good standing, for at least the past 10 years, of the states that they are chosen to represent, and shall not have held public office in any state for at least the last 10 years.

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.... When the convention finishes crafting the amendments in their final form, we conclude that they must be presented, each as separate proposals, to the people of each state through conventions, that is, voting referendums, thus bypassing the state legislatures. If these amendments, or any of them, are passed by such conventions in three-fourths of the states, the requirements of Article 5 will be fulfilled and the U.S. Constitution shall be amended accordingly.

.... By following the ratification procedure described above, one added benefit will appear: Rather than the proposed amendments crawling through the state legislatures and accumulating votes slowly for years to come, they will be decided on a single day, as provided for by law.

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.... By the very nature of the amendments proposed, state legislatures will face a new task in the meantime: They will need to prepare committees of correspondence with the legislatures of the other states, in order to monitor federal activities and prepare their joint responses where needed. In effect, these committees will form a 'shadow legislature' between the feds and the states, and they will require their own organizational structure on a multi-state basis.