VI. Background - Line Item Legislation

HISTORICAL THEORY AND APPLICATION
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.... Political science, like every other science, grows and refines itself over the years. Problems demand solutions, and solutions will be tried and refined – though still other problems may result from this. The process continues and the science improves. But here is the history of political science leading up to Line-Item Legislation:
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.... In the late middle ages, English political writers developed the doctrine of a separation of powers, which was later refined by Montesquieu. This counter-balanced the rule of absolute monarchs and served to check them, and was adopted in England through much political turmoil. Executive and Legislative power would now be divided between a king and a bicameral legislature, each reciprocating and balancing the power of the others, with a separate judiciary.
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.... While this separation of powers was a political improvement, it included new drawbacks. It called for compromise, and this very act obscured the assignment of accountability. In his famous pamphlet Common Sense, Thomas Paine mentioned this fault:

.... “Absolute governments, though the disgrace of human nature, have this advantage with them: that they are simple. If the people suffer, they know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures. But the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover the part in which the fault lies. Some will say in one and some in another, and every political physician will advise a different medicine.”

.... When a king passed legislation through Parliament, and everyone in Parliament was compromising both with the king and with each other, it became difficult to know who truly stood for what, which left the people befuddled.
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.... Later, the U.S. Constitution would adopt a similar separation of powers in the form of an Executive (the President), a bicameral Legislature with a Senate and House of Representatives, and an independent judiciary. But in the executive and legislative branches, the drawback noted by Thomas Paine was carried over in this similar form.
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.... During the Constitutional Convention in 1789, the trade-off between a separation of powers and the issue of accountability was addressed on a smaller scale, pertaining to the Presidency itself. The question was asked: Should there be a single executive – one President alone – or a plural executive – three Presidents serving together in a counsel?
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.... Three Presidents sitting together in a counsel would reciprocate and check the power of each other like a smaller version of the separation of powers doctrine, but the inherent drawback was recognized as well. When something went wrong, those three Presidents would simply blame each other or blame things on a miscarriage of compromise, and leave the people to suffer without remedy.
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.... In the end, the convention delegates decided on a single executive for one reason only: that it was simple. If the people suffered, they would know the head from which their suffering sprang and whom to blame when things went wrong.
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.... The trade-off between accountability and a separation of powers was recognized through their decision. Yet this same principle would be lost again from another direction when this single President made compromises with the two houses of Congress. As long as Legislators could pack legislation with numerous items, and the items were not dealt with in line-item fashion, the sea of compromise would continue and accountability could still be lost because of it.
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THE FOUNDING FATHERS
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.... Now let’s cover the same ground from another direction. The Constitutional delegates were wise men and greatly foresighted, so perhaps it would be fairer to say that they did not overlook this contradiction at all. Perhaps they did not attempt to resolve it because, as a contradiction, it did not yet exist. Perhaps the contradiction arose at a later time as circumstances evolved.
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.... In those days, it was naturally assumed that bills would be smaller in scale and much truer to definition. If bills were indeed smaller, then the Congressional voting procedure, the Presidential veto, and the criteria for overriding a veto would provide suitable accountability since distinction was inherent to the process. But our founding Fathers did not foresee a day when bills would be as thick as a telephone book, filled with corrupt payoffs, hidden earmarks and other pork barrel items, as well as contradictory, holding hostage the benefits to the attending evils.
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.... If this is so, it demonstrates a silent intention on the part of the Constitution’s framers: that bills should be dealt with in small, manageable proportions for the blessings of self-government to be truly effective and representative, and for accountability to be properly assigned.
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THE LINE ITEM VETO IS CREATED
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.... Time passed, bills grew in size and the principles of accountability became lost. The situation worsened because there was power to be gained among Legislators in allowing it to worsen. But at the same time, the President’s role of ultimate accountability was beginning to slip away. Political theory began speculating over answers.
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.... If the President was ultimately to blame for things, perhaps there should be a method for defining his political stands more clearly. Legislation was losing its distinction in all of that mass. Perhaps the Presidential veto should be enhanced in order to counteract this; perhaps a Line Item Veto would be in order?
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.... The Line-Item Veto would, in effect, return legislation to smaller, more reasonable proportions, at least in the final disposition of things. Once again it would make distinctions possible and Presidential accountability could be enforced. While it is true that this addressed the symptoms rather than the cause, it was the most practical option for the time. In those days there were no sophisticated computers to make an alternative possible.
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.... In the first half of the nineteenth century, the idea for a Line-Item Veto was refined. By 1861 it was a proven measure. In that year the southern states, in forming the Confederacy, adopted a Constitution similar to the U.S. Constitution in almost every respect, but one of their few exceptions was the inclusion of a Line-Item Veto. In terms of political development, this was an important point: States, having previously constructed and lived under the original U.S. Constitution, were now saying in effect: “If we had it all to do over again, we would write the Line-Item Veto into the Constitution.”
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.... A principle had been recognized that linked accountability to legislation of manageable proportions. Remedies were sought in relation to the President’s role in the matter but the point was still lost in relation to Congress itself, the actual source of the difficulty. This became increasingly true as bills became larger and larger over the years.
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THE VISION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
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.... Now let’s discuss the principle from still another direction, with reference to the original intention. During the Constitutional convention, Congressional accountability was of paramount concern. Representatives were given short, two-year terms so that they would be extremely accountable to their constituents. Rules of impeachment were also effected for all government officials to keep them accountable to the people and to enforce the fulfillment of their trust at all times.
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.... For themselves, Legislators quickly proved the validity of those suspicions by finding a loophole which allowed them to make their bills as large as they wished. This empowered them, and at the same time hid them from adequate accountability.
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.... As Lord John Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Even so, as Legislators gained more power, the process began to feed on itself until the situation of recent years, and especially the past three years, which is beyond anything reasonable or justifiable.
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.... In summary: the intentions of the Constitutional convention were prudent but the massive compromise involved in producing a bill today has clouded their intentions. And again, the problem may be traced to this root: that bills were never meant to be so big. They need to be much smaller, and thus philosophically purer, to serve the purpose of making distinctions.
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.... With today’s computer power, it is possible to return to the intention of the Constitution’s framers. Bills may now be sub-divided into line items and may be voted on that scale with a perfect record of each politician’s decisions. It is possible to treat the cause itself, and not merely the symptoms, through Line-Item Legislation rather than the Line-Item veto. Not only would this eliminate irresponsible spending but it would make each politician accountable to their constituency once again.
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LINE ITEM LEGISLATION IS ENVISIONED
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.... Line-Item legislation emerged from years of personal observations over voting records and the confusion it has always created. Something much better was needed: a way to explore voting records honestly, that would promote accountability. Finally, this perception was combined with an economic insight which allowed further definition:
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.... In broadest terms, Economics can be defined as supply and demand, resulted in two opposing philosophies: supply side and demand management. Conservative embraces the former and progressives the latter. Yet the two basic ways of thinking are analogous to all types of political philosophy, which allowed correlations. In a personal effort to prove this correlation, the standard conservative issues were reviewed at length. The match-up was complete with a single exception: that conservatives had long advocated the Line-Item veto, which essentially reflects a demand management mentality.
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.... This led to further research over a ‘supply-side’ alternative to the Line-Item veto, what such an alternative might look like, and how it might match a conservative political theory more perfectly. The result has been this study on Line-Item Legislation.
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.... Complications emerged as first the Republicans and then the Democrats proved themselves unworthy of our trust in fiscal matters and accountability. The only true leadership of this country, at this time, is emerging from tea parties and town hall meetings all over America, but the people themselves need national leadership, and that leadership must arise from strong principles.
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.... I envision a new type of politician whose political identity is no longer found in bringing home the pork, but in preventing wasteful spending, so that projects of true priority have adequate resources throughout the country; one who is empowered to take his stands on the basis of conviction and principle, without the allure of massive compromise that could eventually wear him down and corrupt his moral fiber. I envision, not a politician at all, but a true statesman, who hears the voice of his constituents and represents them faithfully, though he may also campaign and reason with them in finding the best way forward for his district and the whole country. Line-Item Legislation is the necessary tool that would actually make this vision possible in its practical terms.